booming automobile plants, metalworking factories, and working-class neighborhoods. Nevertheless, the paulistano labour movement appeared, as late as 1976, incapable of asserting its right to share in the fruits of Brazil's vaunted "economic miracle." Not surprisingly, the historiography of Brazilian labour reflected this pessimism, and sought to account for what was seen primarily as a story of failure.
failing to allow for recognition of union locals at the shopfloor level, the law actively promoted the estrangement of labour leaders from their rank and file. The result was an inherently top-down system, where unions became little more than organs of the government, destroying workers' autonomy and stifling any independent organization.
3
With passage of the 1943 labour code (the Consolidaçâo das leis do trabalho, or CLT), this corporatist framework became a permanent fixture of Brazilian labour relations, enabling it to survive the fall of Vargas and to prosper under both the democratic and military regimes that followed. 4 But in order to keep functioning so well for so long, the system required loyal union officials who were more concerned with delivering services [asistencialismo] than with defending workers against employers. Cynics went even further, arguing that the system required leaders more interested in feathering their nests than in criticizing the government or the capitalist system. These were the pelegos (named for a sheepskin saddle blanket), who cushioned workers from the weight of capitalist exploitation -or cushioned capitalists from the inconvenience of workers' resistance -but did nothing to alter the basic division of labour between oppressor and oppressed.
Left to be explained, however, was why corporatist control of labour proved so effective in Brazil, when similar legislation in Peronist Argentina never successfully debilitated the workers' movement. Much of the classic literature on Peronism also emphasized the rise of state-controlled unions and the corruption of union leaders, and yet Argentina's virtual ungovernability over the last half centurybest illustrated by the insurrectionary Cordoba strikes of 1969-contrasted sharply with the labour peace that characterized Brazil during the same period. To explain this point, a few scholars turned the classic interpretation of Brazilian corporatism on its head, reversing cause and effect to argue that Brazil's labour movement had always been fundamentally weak-hence the ease with which the State corrupted and controlled its leaders. Sheldon Maram, for one, argued that employers successfully divided and conquered their labour force long before Vargas ever appeared on the scene, primarily by exploiting the tension between European immigrants and native (Afro-Brazilian) workers. 9 Thus, the argument went, while Perôn had to provide generous benefits in order to tame the already strong Argentine unions, Vargas was free to mold Brazilian labour as he wished, virtually from the ground up. In the final analysis, however, it did not really matter whether the conformism of its leaders was a source or a symptom of labour's weakness: the overall picture of a passive, manipulated, ineffectual working class remained.
Worker agency: the new wisdom
IN DIFFERENT WAYS, the three books reviewed here challenge the idea that Brazil's corporatist institutions made independent working class action impossible. In his study of Sio Paulo's textile and metallurgical workers between World War I and the 1950s, Joel Wolfe has unearthed a strong yet largely hidden tradition of grassroots radicalism, dating from as early as 1917. This combative heritage, carried by women and men organized in ad hoc factory commissions, was frequently ignored and even opposed by the formal unions, both those led by pelegos and those led by the left. Yet the factory commissions, reflecting the collective consciousness of ordinary workers (many of them women), inspired and facilitated the rise of important strike movements in the 1940s, 1950s, and ultimately the late 1970s.
John French, in contrast, focusses his attention on the relationship between Sâo Paulo's unions, politicians, and the State. Following recent work on populism by scholars such as Daniel James, 6 he argues that Brazilian unions were never simply controlled and manipulated by the government through their pelegos. Rather, Brazilian workers often used the corporatist system to their advantage, wresting significant concessions from populist politicians increasingly dependent upon their support at the polls. While some pelegos were unquestionably corrupt and unwilling to defend their rank and file, others subtly exploited what limited opportunities the authoritarian labour relations system afforded them. That the approaches and conclusions of Wolfe and French are so completely at odds testifies to the richness of the ongoing debate over Brazilian workers in the corporatist era, and demonstrates, as we will see, how current ideological struggles within the Brazilian left continue to shape and inform the historiography of labour. Margaret Keek's contemporary study of the Workers' Party (PT) deals less directly with labour. Her concern is with the PT's difficult transition from a grassroots working-class movement of radical opposition to authoritarianism, to just one of several parties in a young democracy, devoted to broadening its appeal, winning elections, and running municipal governments. Even so, her book raises in a contemporary setting many of the same questions that so divide Wolfe and French: whether or not popular leaders can work within government structures without being co-opted, and whether workers should ideally fight their battles at the point of production or in the larger political arena. On the one hand, Keck argues that the FT has been uniquely successful in achieving power without falling into old Brazilian habits of patronage, paternalism and populism, and without losing The "local, independent organizations" at the center of Wolfe's story are shopfloor level factory commissions: informal, ad hoc groupings of between five and fifty people in a single plant or sometimes a single division of a plant. At various times and under varying conditions, the commissions lodged workers' complaints against unfair rules and abusive foremen; negotiated such issues as workplace organization, machine speeds, and piece rates; and organized strikes. In Wolfe's view, these factory commissions were the grass roots -the authentic and militant voice of the average worker, a voice that otherwise had no place to be heard.
The relation between the factory commissions and formal labour unions was complex, ever-changing, and often antagonistic. Normally, the unions and the commissions simply ignored one another. Employers dealt with one or the other as it suited their interests, while the labour ministry acted as if the commissions did not exist. At other times, union leaders actively thwarted grassroots organizing, or more typically, intervened in local conflicts at the eleventh hour, presenting themselves as the workers' legitimate spokesmen and negotiating agreements that satisfied their own agendas but ignored or de-emphasized the commissions' original demands. (Wolfe, 20, for example)
In the textile industry, this distance between rank-and-file commissions and the official unions was exacerbated by gender conflict Wolfe asserts that a majority of textile operatives in So Paulo were women, yet they had no voice in the all-male textile unions. At its most benign, the exclusion of women led to serious sins of omission -failure to pursue charges of sexual harrassment by foremen, for example. But in times of high unemployment, male unionists proved actively hostile to working women, whom they blamed for taking men's jobs and forcing down wages. (Wolfe, 12) Even the discourse of formal unionism was heavily laden with gender stereotypes, depicting work as "manly" and unemployment as emasculating, while praising the domestic ideal of femininity and undervaluing women's contributions both as workers and as potential militants. Reality contrasted sharply with this image, Wolfe argues, as women played a leading role in the textile factory commissions.
On the surface, then, Wolfe's description of unrepresentative unions seems to echo the familiar critique of corporatism and peleguismo. Indeed, Wolfe casts the pelegos in an even worse light than the traditional image. For example, he notes that while payment of the imposto sindical was mandatory for all workers, only dues-paying members Wolfe's argument is more sophisticated, however, than the old wisdom in several important ways. First, he argues that militant anarchist and communist unions were often just as guilty of ignoring their rank and file as were the corrupt, government-controlled pelego unions, and he notes that conflict existed between factory commissions and formal unions long before Getulio Vargas came to power. In other words, Wolfe agrees that Vargas' later success in reshaping labour relations on the corporatist model can be explained in part by the weakness of Brazil's unions prior to 1930. This does not prove, however, that Brazilian workers lacked militancy, only that they were badly represented by self-appointed leaders more interested in extraneous political issues-like Brazil's role in World War I-than with the bread-and-butter needs that so desperately concerned the rank and file.
Secondly, Wolfe rejects the old wisdom's central tenet that the Estado Nova's corporatist labour legislation prevented grassroots worker militancy. Clearly pelego unions, dependent upon government recognition and the imposto sindical, rarely mounted significant opposition to employers or to the government. Wolfe, however, argues that because the official unions had so few members and because rank and file workers continued to prefer their factory commissions, the unions could not perform a social control function because they were so absolutely irrelevant. (Wolfe, 81,85,93) Indeed, under some circumstances even employers found themselves preferring to negotiate with the commissions, because only the commissions enjoyed the moral authority to speak for workers and enforce agreements. How, then, was worker militancy controlled? Wolfe argues that direct repression, sometimes by industrialists, sometimes by the State, played a far more important role than corruption or co-optation. Shopfloor leaders were frequently fired or arrested, and strikes were broken up by police and the military. In addition, industrialists enacted a variety of internal measures designed to foster loyalty to the enterprise or -more often -to undermine worker solidarity. Factories held competitions to reward the most productive workers, opened cafeterias and stores providing scarce and otherwise expensive food at a discount, and in the 1950s rationalized production lines. Each episode of worker mobilization generated a backlash, as governments closed the political space as soon as they were able to do so. Because they were subject to intervention by the ministry of labour, formal unions fell victim to purges and crackdowns. But the factory commissions, with their informal, ad hoc organization, were better able to survive, persist, and reemerge when conditions again permitted. In this way, Wolfe argues, Sâo Paulo's factory commissions became the vehicle by which industrial workers passed down a tradition and collective memory of militant resistance from one generation to the next.
Wolfe's book goes a long way toward explaining the paradox of weak labour unions in a city capable of mobilizing massive numbers of workers during ostensibly "spontaneous" strikes. By documenting the persistence of grassroots organization at the shopfloor level, he proves that those strikes were anything but spontaneous. He also shows that Brazil's corporatist legal superstructure was not the straitjacket that the old wisdom led us to believe. For those reasons, as well as for its attention to neglected gender issues, Working Women, Working Men is useful and valuable. Nonetheless, any study as ambitious as Wolfe's must expect some criticism. First and foremost, considering the central ity of factory commissions to his argument, Wolfe devotes startlingly little attention to the concrete characteristics and day-to-day praxis of those organizations. How were commission leaders chosen? Were they chosen, or were they a self-appointed vanguard? When and how often did the commissions meet? Was there long-term continuity of leadership over time, or was there frequent turnover? Did commissions continue to organize in times of relative labour peace, or did they arise only during moments of conflict? If they did meet in times of labour peace, what functions did they perform, and what was their relationship with industrialists? Were all commissions equally militant, or were some commissions under management control?
These questions are not merely interesting or academic: rather, they cut to the heart of Wolfe's essential argument that the factory commissions faithfully spoke for a combative rank and file.
7 Clearly this is the perception of the workers Wolfe interviewed, but we have no way of knowing whether his oral histories represent a cross-section of the workforce or a self-selected group of militants. Indeed, at one point Wolfe mentions, almost in passing, that commissions sometimes played a coercive role -for example, pressuring workers not to participate in factory incentive programs or other schemes to increase production. (Wolfe, 150) Was this the action of a class-conscious majority enforcing its collective will against a few deviants, or a strong-arm tactic employed by a precarious vanguard? It may have been the former, but Wolfe offers only assertion, not proof.
Peleguismo and politics: a reassessment
JUST AS IMPORTANTLY, Wolfe's otherwise laudable search for the grassroots worker diverts his attention from other -and potentially more significantsources of historical change. When explaining the causes of the 1917 General Strike, the post-World War II strike wave, the strike of the 300,000, or other major episodes of unrest, Wolfe emphasizes developments either at the point of production or in household consumption levels -in his view, oppressive factory structures, poor working conditions, low wages, and the high cost of living were the decisive forces driving worker resistance. Wolfe provides original and important information on all of these issues, but in so doing he leaves the impression that national and local politics were only significant insofar as they opened or closed the space for popular mobilization from below. John French takes a very different view. In The Brazilian Workers' ABC, a study of unions and politics in the industrial suburbs of Sâo Paulo, he argues that labour's fate, and the consciousness of ordinary workers, cannot be divorced from the larger political picture. In 20th-century Brazil, that picture was dominated by For example, in the brief democratic interlude that followed World War II, as Getulio Vargas abandoned the authoritarianism of the Estado Novo and began to court labour as a base of support, many unions found that they could achieve major gains by pursuing collective grievance cases [dissidios coletivos] against employers in the labour courts. Not only did the courts increasingly rule in the workers' favour, but the very act of filing a dissfdio coletivo cloaked workers' demands in a respectability that in turn legitimized strikes, demonstrations, and the entire range of other tactics employed to press their gains. (French, 96-7,156-7) In short, working through formal channels did not rule out more militant strategies: rather, it complemented them and gave them force.
Central to French's vindication of Brazilian unions is his emphasis on their realism and responsivity to opportunity. That opportunity was created in part by political leaders -Vargas on the national level, Adhemar de Barros in the State of Sao Paulo -who for the first time in Brazilian history rode to power with the electoral support of the urban working class. By rhetorically embracing the workers' cause, these populist politicians brought about two important changes: first, they relaxed some of the controls on workers' organization, providing an opening for both unions and the Communist Party. Second, they validated and gave voice to workers' demands, contributing in no small way to the growth of a more radical class consciousness. This second point is controversial but important. For example, whereas Wolfe explains the strikes of 1945-46 as a reaction to concrete conditions-a decline in real wages after several years of massive wartime profits, line speedups, undercompensated overtime, and a string of broken promisesFrench argues that those strikes were equally inspired by "popular Getulismo," workers' inchoate faith that Vargas was finally on their side. As French puts it:
While he sought to blur the lines between social classes .... the effect of Getulio's rhetoric was to foster a common group identity among ABC's discontented but expectant factory workers.... Rather than hindering the development of class consciousness among workers, these populist appeals actually served as a rallying point that helped to unify the working class and increase its confidence. Historians should not be criticized for limiting themselves to their sources, but future scholars need to test Wolfe's and French's conclusions against the later period: will they find corrupted, hamstrung unions serving the military regime while grassroots worker militancy bubbled below the surface, or will they find hard-nosed but realistic union leaders making the best of a terrible situation? Whichever way, the old corporatism-as-social-control thesis is likely to emerge worse for wear.
10 But we must be careful not to go too far in the other direction, seeing strength and resistance everywhere, to the point that the decade of labour demobilization under military rule becomes nothing more than a prologue to the Sào Bernardo strikes. Defeat, unfortunately, is also a part of working-class history.
Grassroots activism, politics, and the contemporary debate THE CENTRAL ISSUE raised by Wolfe's emphasis on rank-and-file militancy versus French's focus on organized labour's alliance strategy can be summed up in two related questions: first, are workers best served by fighting their battles directly against employers, or are they better equipped to pursue change through legislation? Second, do political involvement and cooperation with government agencies complement the struggle at the point of production, or sabotage it? The first question involves a comparison of workers' bargaining strength and capacity to strike, versus their ability to affect political outcomes. The second hinges on the extent to which State intervention in labour relations promotes or undermines union power. Traditional students of Latin American labour, going back at least to Robert Alexander in the 1950s and 1960s, have generally argued that the region's workers enjoyed far more political power than economic clout vis-à-vis industrialists, but that the "overpoliticization" of unions, paradoxically, operated against workers' long-term interests by subordinating union goals to partisan politics and estranging union leaders from the rank and file." As we have already seen, Wolfe rejects the first proposition but largely accepts the second, while French argues the opposite. openly supported the autenticos, and unlike parties of the past, honoured an explicit pledge to respect and defend union autonomy. Even though unionists held most of the high posts within the party hierarchy and vice versa, party affairs and union affairs were scrupulously kept separate. Candidates for union leadership, for example, were not allowed to use the Party name. (Keck, 184) A tacit division of labour emerged, in which unions remained responsible for leading their own struggles, while the party sought only to improve the environment in which those struggles might be prosecuted. Legislative activity in and of itself "was not expected to be an important vehicle of change." (Keck, 185) Second, again paradoxically, the ever-present temptation to cross that dividing line was diminished by the PT's electoral defeat in 1982. The setback momentarily convinced many PT activists that grassroots activism, not electoral politics, offered the best opportunity for change. This "return to the base" strengthened the local organizations to the point that they temporarily eclipsed the party, ensuring their continued autonomy even as the PT later re-emerged as a viable force in 1985. (Keck, 187-8)
Finally, Keck argues that the PT may actually have succeeded -at least partially -in overcoming Przeworski's electoral dilemma, broadening its appeal over the course of the 1980s without compromising its commitment to the union movement. It did so by redefining the working class to include not just manual and industrial workers, but wage-earners of all kinds, including white-collar employees and salaried professionals. This ideological redefinition was inspired and promoted by the vertiginous rise of militant white-collar unionism in Brazil, particularly among teachers, bank workers, and public employees.
13 Indeed, noting the rise of white-collar strikes in the 1980s, and the growing presence of white-collar unionists among the PT's top leadership (the PT's second and third Presidents were both bank workers), Keck speculates that a sea change may be underway. As the PT inevitably moves toward a more inclusive discourse, white-collar unionists ease the tension between its multiclass political appeal and its union roots. As Keck puts it: "when middle-class candidates for elective office were middle-class unionists, they created a bridge between the two." (193) Keek's optimism is well-tempered by caution. She understands the obstacles that lie between "movement and politics," and knows that if the PT has succeeded so far in overcoming or avoiding some of the dilemmas of success, it still has a long way to travel. The biggest question, of course, is what might happen when and if the PT becomes the party in power at the national level. Keck descibes the enormous problems that confronted the PT municipal governments, as they had to deal with a broad range of competing interests in a climate of austerity. (Keck, 199-215) She has no illusion that those problems will not be far more intractable In Sâo Paulo, Rio, and a few other major cities, bank workers have actually been unionized since the 1920s and 1930s. Only with the new Constitution of 1988 were public employees officially given the right to organize. from Brasilia. There may be additional reasons for pessimism as well. Studies from other Latin American nations hint that the militant leaders of white-collar unions, typically former activists in university politics, seldom represent the views of their more conservative constituents.
14 Thus, they may not be such an effective bridge between the PT's working-class base and a more inclusive electoral message.
But above all, the PT has already begun to realize that electoral politics in Brazil are now, more than ever before in the nation's history, dominated by the mass media. On the one hand, this is an enormous opportunity, as television antennas increasingly adorn the tin or plywood roofs in even the poorest neighborhoods, both urban and rural. Illiterate and semi-literate inhabitants of Brazil' sfavelas, in some ways the PT's natural power base, are now voters, and may comprise a majority of the electorate. On the other hand, while the PT has made innovative use of the mass media in past elections (Keck, 154), picture-tube politics can only increase the distance between party leaders and their union base. And given the agenda of Brazil's corporate media giants -many credit TV Olobo for the 1988 election of photogenic outsider Fernando Collor de Mello -the FT faces an enormous temptation to moderate its message in search of media "respectability," or face de facto censorship.
For all of these reasons, we may find -in spite of the New Unionism -that populism is far from dead in Brazil. Political parties have strong incentives to court the working-class vote, but equally strong incentives to avoid giving workers real power. 13 The temptation to see unions as instruments, not partners, is still quite high. For their part, union leaders will remain tempted to look for change from above rather than from below, as long as workers' electoral clout outstrips their bargaining power against employers. This is almost certainly the case in times of worldwide recession, economic restructuring, and high unemployment. To their credit, both the New Unionism and the Workers' Party have largely resisted those incentives and temptations. But notwithstanding the PT's long-term success or failure, these fine studies by Wolfe, French, and Keck all serve as reminders, each in its own way, that workers' resistance takes many forms, employs many strategies, but -above all else -endures. 
